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AGAINST CATEGORICAL PREEMPTION: VACCINES
AND THE COMPENSATION PIECE OF THE
PREEMPTION PUZZLE
Catherine M. Sharkey*
INTRODUCTION
Preemption is the doctrine whereby federal law displaces state law.
Preemption doctrine is divided into express preemption, which occurs
when Congress includes an explicit preemption provision in a statute,
and implied preemption, when there is no such express provision but
preemption may nonetheless be inferred from the statutory and regu-
latory scheme. Implied preemption is further divided into field pre-
emption, when federal law so dominates an area such that there is no
room left for state law to operate, and conflict preemption, a narrower
form of preemption that occurs when federal law displaces only that
state law with which it is at odds or in tension. The degree of conflict
spawns further doctrinal categories: impossibility preemption, when
an actor could not follow the dictates of state law while complying
with federal law, and obstacle preemption, when the state law ob-
structs or frustrates the purposes of the federal statutory or regulatory
scheme.
While these neat doctrinal categories provide a semblance of order,
they offer little in terms of a coherent analytical framework for the
resolution of preemption disputes. The line separating express and
implied preemption, for example, is not so distinct. Even when Con-
gress includes an express preemption provision in a statute, the scope
of intended preemption is often ambiguous and textual analysis comes
up short; courts then resort to some of the same inferential analyses
that unfold under implied preemption.' Nor does the existence of an
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1. Conversely, implied impossibility preemption can resemble express preemption analysis.
Consider, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct.
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express preemption provision (or an express savings provision) pre-
clude courts from applying implied preemption principles; in other
words, cases involving statutory preemption provisions are often both
express and implied preemption cases.
For this reason, when textual analysis fails (or comes up short), a
basic framework centered on legal and functional considerations that
transcend these doctrinal categories is needed. In tort preemption
cases (my focus in this Article), when federal law ousts conflicting
state tort law, two fundamental functional premises should hold true:
(1) the federal standard of care is more than a minimal standard and
(2) the state standard of tort liability has a significant regulatory effect
(if not the regulatory purpose) by trading off risks and benefits to in-
hibit or to encourage risk-taking conduct that interferes with, or sub-
stantially alters, a federal regulatory scheme. The regulatory role of
state tort law is front and center in this paradigm of preemption.
But what about the compensatory role of tort law? Should there, in
fact, be a third premise that the federal regulatory regime must pro-
vide a substitute to injured victims for tort-based compensation? Or
perhaps a weaker version, such that the absence of federally provided
compensation is a thumb on the scale against preemption? Con-
versely, should the existence of such a federal compensation scheme
weigh in favor of preemption?
In the products liability realm, when Congress enacts statutes and
federal agencies implement them with regulations, full attention is de-
voted to the standard-setting or regulatory side of the equation; com-
pensation is typically not addressed. 2 The National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act (Vaccine Act) is a notable exception-it is the rare
example whereby Congress provides for a federally administered
compensation fund alongside its newly fashioned regulatory stan-
2567 (2011), the generic-drug preemption case. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, focused
narrowly on the text of the relevant federal regulations (as interpreted by the FDA) and held
that it was impossible for generic-drug manufacturers to satisfy the state common law duty to
provide additional warnings, consistent with the federal "sameness" dictate that prohibits
generic-drug labels from deviating from their brand name counterparts. The Court resolved the
case solely on implied impossibility preemption and thus did not consider the wider obstacle (or
frustration of purposes) preemption. See id. at 2581 n.7 ("[Tihat type of pre-emption [obstacle]
is not argued here."). In that regard, the Court's analysis shares more affinities with express
preemption cases-in which the Court's task is to interpret the language of the explicit preemp-
tion provision-than implied obstacle preemption cases that require resort to extra-textual
sources, chief among them the agency's stated objectives, regulatory record, and views on
preemption.
2. Some prominent examples include the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006),
the Recreational Boat Safety Act, 43 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006), and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
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dards.3 The vaccine context thus provides an opportunity to explore
the relationship between preemption and compensation.
Who better to inspire such ruminations than Robert Rabin? Profes-
sor Rabin's own academic career traversed from administrative law
into torts. His grounding in both fields is reflected in his equanimous
approach to federal preemption, whereby he "join[s] those commenta-
tors who seek to forge a path that recognizes the distinct benefits that
both regulation and tort have to offer." 4 Professor Rabin has also
written extensively on compensation systems, placing the Vaccine
Compensation Fund into context as arising out of "a crisis atmos-
phere" in which "the individual rights perspective of tort yielded to a
collective, insurance-based model of compensation." 5
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, a vaccine preemption case heard in the
October 2010 Term and decided February 22, 2011, provocatively
characterized the symbiotic relationship as a "quid pro quo": "The
vaccine manufacturers fund from their sales an informal, efficient
compensation program for vaccine injuries; in exchange they avoid
costly tort litigation and the occasional disproportionate jury ver-
dict."6 But these are Justice Scalia's words, not Congress's. Congress
was in fact much more cryptic about any link between the federally
provided compensation and state tort law remedies.
Bruesewitz illustrates a more general conundrum: when statutory
text is ambiguous, precisely where should courts turn to elucidate con-
gressional intent? "[T]he purpose of Congress is," according to the
Supreme Court, "the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case."7
Bruesewitz follows a long line of cases whereby the Court interjects
policy-laden principles cloaked in an analysis of congressional intent.
While in previous cases such policy-laden principles have centered
upon institutional comparisons of juries versus agencies as decision
3. The Vaccine Compensation Fund joins a handful of specialty administrative compensation
schemes put forth by Congress. See, e.g., Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801); September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 237, 237-41 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
4. Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain ofAccidental Hann: Conflicting Concep-
tions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 987, 1009 (2009) [hereinafter Rabin, Territorial
Claims].
5. Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 699,
708 (2005).
6. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1080 (2011) (footnote omitted).
7. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
2012] 645
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makers, in Bruesewitz the existence of the federally provided compen-
sation scheme is front and center.
In this Article, I provide some alternative frames for analysis.
Frame One is conventional statutory interpretation focused on statu-
tory text and legislative history. Although it is an express preemption
case (Congress included a preemption provision in the relevant stat-
ute), Bruesewitz cannot be resolved using statutory text alone, the
protestations of the majority notwithstanding.
Whereas the Court turns to sub rosa policy analysis at this juncture,
I would turn to Frame Two: consideration of the backdrop of tort law-
suits at the time when Congress acted and, relatedly, whether Con-
gress provided a substitute administrative compensation scheme for
tort law remedies. This frame is key to resolving disputes that amount
to implied field preemption-namely, a categorical preemption claim
that federal law ousts state law regardless of the precise risks consid-
ered by the underlying federal regulatory agency. For example, under
this definition, the contention that all design-defect claims are pre-
empted by the Vaccine Act is a categorical preemption claim because
it does not depend on the regulating federal agencies-such as the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)-having considered the specific risks
of a particular vaccine, or class of vaccines, in the premarket approval
and postmarket ongoing monitoring processes. The absence of a fed-
erally provided compensation scheme in an area in which Congress
legislates against a backdrop of tort lawsuits should preclude an asser-
tion of a categorical preemption claim. Arguments for field preemp-
tion (the doctrinal stand-in for categorical preemption claims) depend
on the comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme. My argument
here is that the absence of compensation-particularly against a back-
drop in which, prior to enactment of the federal scheme, tort law ef-
fectuated both regulatory and compensatory goals-renders the
regulatory scheme incomplete. Conversely, the existence of a federal
compensation scheme keeps categorical preemption claims on the
table.
But the analysis should not end with Frame Two. Even if a categor-
ical preemption argument fails because of the absence of a federal
compensation fund, a narrower form of risk-based implied conflict
preemption-in which the underlying regulatory agency has consid-
ered the risks and benefits at issue and resolved them in a way that is
at odds or in tension with imposition of the asserted state-law duty-
may be justified. And even where a categorical preemption argument
is plausible, given the existence of a federal compensatory regime,
[Vol. 61:643646
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there may nonetheless be a stronger underlying risk-based argument
worth considering. Here is where Frame Three comes into play.
Frame Three encapsulates the "agency reference model" I have de-
veloped in prior work,8 whose prime target is conflict preemption.
The primary question in conflict preemption cases involving ambigu-
ous congressional intent should be whether the federal agency consid-
ered the same risks and benefits that are the source of the competing
state standard. Substantial deference should also be accorded to the
underlying agency's position on preemption, based on the thorough-
ness and consistency of its considered views. Bruesewitz warrants pre-
emption under this standard, but its holding would be limited to
vaccines for diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP), the class whose
safety profile was investigated by the FDA and CDC, and reviewed by
the courts. Moreover, the fact-intensive review of the regulatory re-
cord called for under this model is likely to better safeguard health
and safety, and accordingly, Frame Three should be preferred to cate-
gorical preemption (if permitted under Frame Two) when congres-
sional intent is ambiguous.
II. FRAME ONE: STATUTORY TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
On its surface, Bruesewitz presented a statutory interpretation ques-
tion, plain and simple, centered on the meaning of the express pre-
emption provision Congress enacted as part of the Vaccine Act:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for dam-
ages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with
the administration of a vaccine . . . if the injury or death resulted
from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions
and warnings.9
The Bruesewitzes contended that this language required a court's
case-by-case determination of whether a vaccine's side effects were
"unavoidable" in order to sustain a preemption finding.10 In the
Bruesewitzes' view, their daughter Hannah's predicament following a
8. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58
DuKE L.J. 2125, 2148-49 & n.89 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Federalism Accountability]. See
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption].
9. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006).
10. Brief for Petitioners at 41, Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152), 2010 WL
2130598 ("[T]he best reading of § 22(b) ... is that a vaccine manufacturer is exempt from civil
liability only upon a case-specific showing that the vaccine's side effects were unavoidable, and,
even then, only if the vaccine was properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and
warnings.").
6472012]
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vaccine injection-a month-long series of violent seizures that led to
permanent brain damage and developmental delays-was entirely
avoidable given a known, safer alternative vaccine design, and thus,
their state law design-defect claim should go forward." Hannah, a
seemingly healthy infant, suffered violent seizures following her injec-
tion with Tri-Immunol, a "whole cell" DTP vaccine manufactured by
Wyeth.12 Her seizures began in April 1992, after she took the third of
five recommended doses of Tri-Immunol. 3 Hannah's dose came from
a particularly troublesome lot, which "generated sixty-five reports of
adverse reactions with the FDA and [CDC], including thirty-nine
emergency room visits, six hospitalizations, and two deaths."14 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Hanna would
likely require permanent medical care for the rest of her life.15 The
Bruesewitzes claimed that Tri-Immunol was defective and that Wyeth
had, at the relevant time, an approved license for Tri-Solgen, an alter-
native, safer "non-cellular" DTP vaccine.' 6
Wyeth raised a preemption defense to the Bruesewitzes' design-
defect claim. In Wyeth's view, the Vaccine Act's preemption provi-
sion categorically preempted liability for design defects, while leaving
intact liability for manufacturing defects and failure to warn.' 7
Neither party's interpretation of the statutory text is entirely satisfy-
ing. The Bruesewitzes' interpretation elevated the import of one stat-
utory phrase-"if the injury or death resulted from side effects that
were unavoidable"-at the expense of the subsequent phrase (which
it rendered superfluous)-"even though the vaccine was properly pre-
pared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings."' 8
And Wyeth's interpretation committed the same sin in reverse.
11. Id. at 22.
12. "Whole cell" vaccines such as Tri-Immunol were the first type of vaccine developed to
inoculate children against DTP and licensed by the National Health Institute in 1948.
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).
13. See id. at 237.
14. Id. "Hannah's physician later indicated, as part of this litigation, that she would not have
immunized Hannah had she known of the adverse event reports associated with this lot of the
vaccine." Id.
15. Id. at 236.
16. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 430, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2007); see also infra notes
92-98 and accompanying text.
17. Brief for Respondent at 24, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152),
2010 WL 2962899 ("The plain text of Section 22(b)(1) categorically preempts design-defect
claims.").
18. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 10, at 25-26; see also Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1078
("Since a vaccine is not 'quite incapable of being made safer for [its] intended use' if manufactur-
ing defects could have been eliminated or better warnings provided, the entire 'even though'
clause is a useless appendage." (alteration in original)).
[Vol. 61:643648
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Namely, it emphasized the latter phrase, in effect reading the "una-
voidable" clause out of the statute.19
Nor does legislative history provide definitive resolution. The
Bruesewitzes have support for their position that "Congress designed
the Compensation Program to be an 'appealing alternative' to, but not
a substitute for, the traditional tort system." 20 They relied on a state-
ment in a 1986 House Energy Committee Report: "Vaccine-injured
persons will now have an appealing alternative to the tort system." 21
The Bruesewitzes read this as Congress's intention that the Compen-
sation Program "be a carrot, not a stick." 22 They pointed to further
support in a 1987 House Budget Committee Report (which accompa-
nied Congress's funding legislation for the 1986 Vaccine Act) that in-
cludes the emphatic statement:
It is important to note that both at the time of original enactment
and in passing this legislation, the Committee acted with the under-
standing that tort remedies were and are available....
It is not the Committee's intention to preclude court actions
under applicable law.. .. An amendment to establish as part of this
compensation system that a manufacturer's failure to develop safer
vaccine was not grounds for liability was rejected by the Committee
during its original consideration of the Act.2 3
19. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 30-31; see also Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1094
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("There would have been no need for Congress to include the addi-
tional 13 words 'the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even
though."'); Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1094 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority's interpre-
tation of §22(b)(1) functionally excises 13 words out of the statute, including the key term
'unavoidable."').
20. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 10, at 12.
21. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6367; ac-
cord Brief for Petitioners, supra note 10, at 24.
22. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 17, Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 2010 WL 3334502.
23. H.R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. 1, at 691 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-
65; accord Brief for Petitioners, supra note 10, at 15-16. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, "the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one." Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). The court thus "refuse[d] to view the relevant
legislative history as containing 'dueling' committee reports." Id.
This issue divided the U.S. Supreme Court. The dissent reasoned that "[blecause the tort
reforms in the 1986 Act . . . had no operative legal effect unless and until Congress provided
funding for the compensation program, the views of the Congress that enacted that funding
legislation are a proper and, indeed, authoritative guide to the meaning of § 22(b)(1)."
Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1092-93 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But the majority emphatically
rejected this proposition: "Post-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a
legitimate tool of statutory interpretation. . . . Permitting the legislative history of subsequent
funding legislation to alter the meaning of a statute would set a dangerous precedent." Id. at
1081-82 (majority opinion).
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The Bruesewitzes attempted to bolster their case by arguing that
the limitations of the "Vaccine Court,"24 in particular the absence of a
right to discovery,25 demonstrate that Congress could not have in-
tended to oust tort law. They claimed that "Congress preserved vic-
tims' right to seek relief through the civil justice system precisely
because the Vaccine Court process contains limits." 2 6 One of their
amici chimed in that Congress, "[k]nowing the importance of the tool
of discovery to explaining how vaccine injuries occur," would not have
taken it away from injured children by preempting civil tort suits. 2 7
But Wyeth provided equally strong support for the opposite view
that Congress intended to preempt tort suits alleging design defects
(while preserving those alleging manufacturing defects and failure to
warn) by giving injured victims an outlet for compensation. Wyeth
too quoted from the 1986 House Energy Committee Report, which
states that if vaccine-injured persons cannot demonstrate "either that
a vaccine was improperly prepared or that it was accompanied by im-
24. The Vaccine Act created the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, an adminis-
trative no-fault scheme whereby claimants seeking damages for vaccine-related injuries must
first file a petition in the administrative division of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300aa-11(a) (2006). Special masters preside over these claims in "Vaccine Court" in proceed-
ings that are "less-adversarial, expeditious, and informal" as compared to civil courts. Id.
§ 300aa-12(d)(2)(A).
25. Rule 7(a) of the Vaccine Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims reads: "There
is no discovery as a matter of right. The informal and cooperative exchange of information is the
ordinary and preferred practice." U.S. Court of Federal Claims App. B, Rule 7(A), at 123,
available at http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court-info/Vaccinerules 20100111
v4.pdf [hereinafter Vaccine Rules]. The 1986 House Energy Committee Report elaborates:
In order to expedite .the proceedings, the power of the Special Master is intended to
replace the usual rules of discovery in civil actions in Federal courts. Because the only
issues relevant to the compensation proceeding are whether the petitioner suffered a
compensable injury and, if so, the extent of compensable damages, there should be no
need for a wider inquiry, which might be appropriate in a civil action raising other
issues.
H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt.1, at 16.
26. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 10, at 57 (emphasis added). The Bruesewitzes complain
that special masters "normally do not permit [discovery]." Id. But in the Bruesewitzes' own
case in Vaccine Court, the special master noted that she allowed the "extensive discovery that
petitioners wanted." Bruesewitz v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-0266V,
slip op. at 26 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 20, 2002) 2002 WL 31965744. The judge allowed almost everything
the parties requested, including testimony from doctors and subpoenas to obtain hospital
records. See id. at 2-3. The Vaccine Act grants special masters broad discretion, authorizing
them to "require the testimony of any person and the production of any documents as may be
reasonable and necessary." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(B)(iii). The definition of what is "rea-
sonable and necessary" is subject to debate; not surprisingly, there appears to be variation in the
vaccine cases with respect to the amount of discovery allowed. See, e.g., DeLoatch v. Sec'y of
Health & Hum. Servs., No. 09-171V, slip op. at 3 (Fed. Cl. July 28,2010) ("[S]pecial masters have
refrained from ordering discovery in a variety of contexts.").
27. Brief of Vaccine Injured Petitioners Bar Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 20, Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 2010 WL 2208240.
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proper directions or inadequate warnings [they] should pursue recom-
pense in the compensation system, not the tort system." 28 Wyeth
further claimed that the very existence of the compensation program
was evidence of Congress's intent to funnel all design-defect claims to
the Vaccine Court.29
The Solicitor General weighed in on Wyeth's side, touting the
"close fit" between the Vaccine Act's "preemptive reach and its com-
pensatory promise."30 In the government's view, "Congress saw the
Compensation Program as the critical counterpart to Section
22(b)(1)'s withdrawal of certain tort remedies."31 And, according to
the Solicitor General (with no pretense here of ascribing the view to
Congress), "[t]he Compensation Program is a 'no fault' scheme analo-
gous to other 'no fault' schemes that supplant tort law." 32
Here, congressional intent is in the eye of the beholder, made all
the more possible given Congress's contradictory impulses, as re-
flected in ambiguous statutory text and internally inconsistent legisla-
tive history.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the statutory text and legislative
history, the majority, led by Justice Scalia, engages in a textualist tour
de force, replete with an exegesis of "concessive subordinate
clauses,"33 to find congressional clarity. But Justice Stephen Breyer's
concession-that "the textual question considered alone is a close
one" 3 4-iS closer to the truth. Moreover, the majority opinion doth
28. Brief for Respondent, supra note 17, at 47 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 26).
29. Id. at 29 ("Petitioners' argument [that design-defect claims survive] is ... belied by the
structure of the Vaccine Act, which establishes a comprehensive federal scheme . . . .").
30. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28, Bruesewitz,
131 S. Ct. 1068, 2010 WL 3017753 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief].
31. Id. at 25-26.
32. Id. at 34. The Solicitor General, moreover, pressed the inherent advantages of an adminis-
trative compensation program over tort law: it is faster; petitioners recover legal fees regardless
of whether they prevail; exchanges are informal, cooperative, and flexible; and "[tihe Compensa-
tion Program never requires proof of who manufactured the vaccine, which can be a stumbling
block in the tort system." Id. at 26-27. With respect to attorneys' fees, special masters have
discretion to award them so long as "the petition was brought in good faith and there was a
reasonable basis for the claim which the petition was brought." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)
(2006) (emphases added); see also Vaccine Rules, supra note 25, Rule 13, at 131 ("Attorneys'
Fees & Costs").
33. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1078 (arguing that § 22(b)(1)'s concessive subordinate
clause-"even though"-creates opposition between the prerequisites of proper preparation
and proper labeling and the word "unavoidable," and that the petitioners' assertion that proper
preparation and proper labeling are two prerequisites independent of unavoidability would only
be defensible if the statute used "a coordinating conjunction like 'and,' not a subordinating junc-
tion like 'even though"').
34. Id. at 1082 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6512012]1
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
protest too much. If textual clarity could actually be found, then there
would be no need for most of the additional analytical points in the
opinion.35
III. POLICY MASQUERADING AS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Congressional intent is the touchstone of the U.S. Supreme Court's
preemption jurisprudence. So long as it is within its Commerce
Clause authority, Congress can act to displace state law, and, if it does
so expressly (and clearly), the preemption inquiry is over. Several
scholars, Professor Rabin among them, have argued that policy analy-
sis has no place in this essentially constitutional decision.36 Moreover,
they argue that Congress (not courts and not federal agencies) must
decide whether to preempt state law. Professor Rabin seems confi-
dent that Congress can-and should-clearly express its intent to pre-
empt state tort law and then delineate the precise scope of such
preemption.
As an institutional matter, I have much less faith in Congress.
Bruesewitz is a case in point, demonstrating that even in the rare in-
stance when Congress focuses on the issue of compensation along
with preemption, the result is a far cry from clarity. Moreover, the
formalist response, represented by fidelity to the "presumption
against preemption" and invocation of "clear statement" rules-
where Congress has been anything less than crystal clear, do not pre-
empt 37-does not strike me as normatively desirable, given the
context-specific inquiry that is called for in resolving a preemption dis-
pute. Because the devil is in the details of the statutory and regula-
tory scheme, we ought not decide these cases on general
presumptions. Moreover, Congress, in the rare instance in which it is
clear, is apt (as has historically been the case) to give an ideologically
35. In that regard, the opinion is reminiscent of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008),
also authored by Justice Scalia, which declares that the pro-preemption outcome is dictated by
plain statutory language, but then wanders far beyond mere statutory interpretation. See gener-
ally Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products
Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 437 (2009).
36. According to Rabin, regulatory compliance is about the competency of courts vis-A-vis
regulators, whereas preemption is only about whether Congress intended to displace state tort
law. See Rabin, Territorial Claims, supra note 4, at 990. Given that the preemption doctrine is
rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Rabin argues that courts should not engage
in the explicit weighing of competing policy interests that is called for under regulatory compli-
ance. See Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J.
2049, 2058 (2000) [hereinafter Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance].
37. The presumption against preemption holds "that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
652 [Vol. 61:643
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inflected thumbs-up or thumbs-down to tort lawsuits across the
board.38
In practice, when courts have considered preemption questions,
congressional intent has provided a hook for consideration of the ba-
sic policy issue whether tort serves a regulatory or compensatory pur-
pose. In its preemption decisions, the Supreme Court has tended to
consider either the regulatory role of tort law (when it decides to pre-
empt) or the compensatory role of tort law (when it refuses to pre-
empt).39 Bruesewitz follows a long line of Supreme Court opinions
that interject policy-laden reasoning under the guise of congressional
intent. In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., Justice Scalia, on behalf of the
majority, opined that "the solicitude for those injured by FDA-
approved devices ... was overcome in Congress's estimation by solici-
tude for those who would suffer without new medical devices if juries
were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 States to all innovations." 4 0
Taking the opposite tack in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the majority
implored, "It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to
pre-empt common-law claims, which-unlike most administrative and
legislative regulations-necessarily perform an important remedial
role in compensating accident victims." 4 1
In Bruesewitz, the Court is not faced with any Faustian dilemma.
For here, at least according to the majority, both the regulatory and
compensatory functions of common law design-defect claims are pro-
moted by the Vaccine Act, which achieves both the effects of "(1)
prompting the development of improved designs, and (2) providing
compensation for inflicted injuries." 42
Justice Scalia makes a further bold claim that Congress intended a
direct quid pro quo-in exchange for funding the compensation
scheme and submitting to federal guidance, vaccine manufacturers
were granted immunity from the unpredictable nature of tort liabil-
ity.4 3 Justice Scalia makes little effort to disguise his-as opposed to
38. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 8, at 2149 ("Legislative pronounce-
ments on preemption (or nonpreemption) are sledgehammers where sharp scalpels are more
appropriate."); id. at 2148 & n.89 ("When Congress does weigh in on the debate in a more
resolute fashion, it is likely to decide preemption on an all-or-nothing basis.").
39. For elaboration, see Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 8, at 459-71.
40. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326. But see id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (rejecting Justice Scalia's reasoning as "a policy argument advanced by the Court,
not by Congress"); id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Congress, in my view, did not intend ...
to effect a radical curtailment of state common-law suits seeking compensation for injuries
caused by defectively designed or labeled medical devices.").
41. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002).
42. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1079 (2011).
43. Id. at 1080.
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Congress's-basic distaste for tort law and juries. In a passage remi-
niscent of the one quoted above from Riegel, Justice Scalia claims that
Congress expressed a preference, "a sensible choice to leave complex
epidemiological judgments about vaccine design to the FDA and the
National Vaccine Program rather than juries."44 He also describes
design-defect claims as "the most speculative and difficult" kinds of
products liability cases.45 (Apart from the more fundamental issue re-
garding policy-inflected analysis sneaking in under the guise of con-
gressional intent, tort scholars might well question whether design-
defect claims deserve this opprobrium any more than, say, failure-to-
warn claims.) Under the veil of congressional intent, Justice Scalia
makes a policy-laden claim that preemption had to be part of any
compromise to entice vaccine manufacturers back into the
marketplace.
Where statutory language is ambiguous, courts do have an alterna-
tive to policy analysis disguised as congressional intent, which leads
me onward to consider alternative frames of analysis.
IV. FRAME Two: TORT BACKDROP AND COMPENSATION
A significant part of Professor Rabin's general unease with both the
state regulatory compliance and federal preemption defenses rests on
the ground that their effect would be to leave some victims uncom-
pensated.46 Professor Rabin is insistent that the Janus-faced nature of
tort must be acknowledged and appreciated. Specifically, "[u]nless [a
regulation] operates in tandem with a legislative compensation
scheme, regulation promotes only deterrence. Tort, whatever its
shortcomings, does double-duty: it is an engine of compensation as
well as deterrence." 47 The same point was made by Justice Harry
Blackmun, in dissent, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, a 1992 watershed
federal preemption case: "[Tjort law has an entirely separate func-
tion-compensating victims-that sets it apart from direct forms of
44. Id. The dissent rebukes the majority:
The majority's decision today disturbs that careful balance based on a bare policy
preference . . .. To be sure, reasonable minds can disagree about the wisdom of having
juries weigh the relative costs and benefits of a particular vaccine design. But whatever
the merits of the majority's policy preference, the decision to bar all design defect
claims against vaccine manufacturers is one that Congress must make, not this Court.
Id. at 1100 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1080 (majority opinion).
46. Robert L. Rabin, Poking Holes in the Fabric of Tort: A Comment, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
293, 300-01 (2007).
47. Id. at 301.
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regulation."48 As section A explores below, the Court's commitment
to upholding the compensatory role of tort law has been erratic.
Beyond the mere acknowledgement of the dual roles of tort, it is
difficult to specify the precise relationship between compensation and
preemption. As detailed below in section B, under my proposed
Frame Two, the absence of a federal compensation scheme would take
arguments for field preemption-defined as categorical preemption of
some class of cases irrespective of the particular circumstances of the
regulated risk-off the table. Compensation thus is inextricably
linked to categorical preemption arguments; however, it is (as we shall
see with Frame Three) not a dispositive factor for risk-based conflict
preemption claims.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Contradictory Impulses
In case after case, the Supreme Court has.seemed to show little hes-
itation about the aftershock of its pro-preemption determinations-
namely, that injured victims would go uncompensated. 49 One must
search the dissents of the Court's forceful preemption cases for hints
of the lurking issue. In Cipollone, Justice Blackmun, in dissent, her-
alded this brave new world: "The Court in the past has hesitated to
find pre-emption where federal law provides no comparable rem-
edy."50 One can follow this thread of indifference to leaving injured
victims remediless up to the present preemption cases. Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, the lone dissenter in Riegel, lamented that Congress
would not "without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse"
for injured victims.51
But the Court has been anything but consistent on this point. In-
deed, an alternative thread highlighting the significance of the absence
of federally provided compensation weaves its way through the cases,
48. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 537 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
49. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that the plaintiff's state
law design-defect case was expressly preempted under the Medical Device Amendments to the
Federal FDCA); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (holding that the
plaintiff's state law fraud-on-the-FDA claim was impliedly preempted under the FDCA); Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that the plaintiffs state law design-
defect claim was impliedly preempted under the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and its imple-
menting regulations).
50. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
51. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 337 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
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leading up to the Court's recent emphatic statement, this time by a
majority of the Court in Wyeth v. Levine:
Congress did not provide a federal remedy for consumers harmed
by unsafe or ineffective drugs in the 1938 [Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act] or in any subsequent amendment. Evidently, it deter-
mined that widely available state rights of action provided
appropriate relief for injured consumers. It may also have recog-
nized that state-law remedies further consumer protection by moti-
vating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to
give adequate warnings. 52
The concern raised by Justice Ginsburg in dissent in Riegel is the
same as that raised by the majority in Levine. In Levine, the absence
of a federal compensation scheme grounds the majority's understand-
ing of congressional intent and points against preemption; whereas in
Riegel, it is inconsequential to the Court's determination of preemp-
tion. This demonstrates the endless malleability of the concept of con-
gressional intent to fit a prevailing view of the acceptability of
upending tort compensation altogether so long as regulatory goals are
met.
B. Linking Compensation to Categorical Preemption
The Court's treatment of tort as compensation in its preemption
decisions has been erratic to date. How should compensation be ad-
ded into the analysis?
Professor Rabin argues that when Congress acts, it legislates against
a background norm of preserving tort as a system of compensation.53
Congress weighs the potential downside of second-guessing federal
standards against the upside of compensation for individuals in con-
sidering whether to displace common law suits. 5 4 Rabin's framework,
then, has much in common with the classic formalist presumption
against preemption.55 Rabin's framework would likewise operate as a
default canon of statutory interpretation whereby the absence of a
federally provided remedy tips the balance against a preemption
determination.
I think this goes too far. Moreover, such a default canon would be a
double-edged sword that could work just as forcefully in the direction
52. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (footnote omitted).
53. See Rabin, Territorial Claims, supra note 4, at 1001.
54. See id.
55. Kenneth Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky take up this classic position as amici curiae in
Bruesewitz. See Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth W. Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky in Support of
Petitioners at 3, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (No. 09-152), 2010 WL 2224727
(arguing for the need to find Congress's "clear and manifest preemptive purpose").
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of preemption. In other words, the provision of a compensation
scheme-such as the Vaccine Compensation Fund-would fuel a pre-
sumption in favor of preemption. Indeed, there are strong signals that
this was at work in Justice Scalia's Bruesewitz opinion.
But the absence of federally provided compensation should defeat a
subclass of preemption arguments-those framed as field preemption
or categorical preemption arguments. Field preemption arguments
depend upon the comprehensiveness of the statutory and regulatory
scheme. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court has exercised cau-
tion in the realm of implied field preemption: "[W]e will seldom infer,
solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to
pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety." 56
Aviation is the prototypical example of a realm conducive to im-
plied field preemption arguments. 7 The Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) has implemented a detailed and far-ranging system of
rules regulating all aspects of flight safety, from pilot certification and
preflight duties to flight responsibilities and flight rules.58 In City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, the Supreme Court held that the
''pervasive nature" of federal regulation of aircraft noise left no room
for state regulation,59 which was thereby displaced by the federal
Noise Control Act.60 In support of its implied field preemption deter-
56. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985). In Hills-
borough, the Court rejected the argument that the comprehensiveness of the FDA's blood-
plasma regulations was sufficient to preempt state and local regulations touching the same issue.
At the time the FDA issued its regulations, it made clear that they were "not intended to usurp
the powers of State or local authorities to regulate plasmapheresis procedures in their localities."
Id. at 714 (quoting 38 Fed. Reg. 19,365 (July 20, 1973)). Despite the fact that the FDA had
subsequently extended the scope of its regulations, absent clear preemptive intent from Con-
gress (or the FDA), the implied field preemption plea could not overcome what the Court de-
scribed as an "uphill battle." Id.
57. In 1958, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act, which created the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 301(a), 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. §§ 40101). The Act does not contain an express preemption clause and contains a savings
clause for state law remedies. 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c).
There is also express preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which Congress
enacted in 1978. The ADA contains an express preemption provision that prohibits the state
from enacting "a law, regulation, or other provision ... related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier that may provide air transportation." Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1143 (codified at
49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1)).
58. The Federal Aviation Act delegates to the FAA "the power to frame rules for the safe and
efficient use of the nation's airspace." Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894
(2d Cir. 1960).
59. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973).
60. To supplement the Federal Aviation Act, Congress enacted the Noise Control Act of 1972,
which requires the FAA, after consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
to promulgate regulations regarding aircraft noise that are necessary to protect the public health
and welfare. Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4901).
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mination, the Court highlighted the "intricate system of federal com-
mands" governing aviation.61 Courts are divided on how far beyond
Burbank's preemption of aircraft noise regulation to extend the berth
of implied field preemption under the federal aviation statutes.62 But
it is telling that some have embraced the view that, given the breadth
and depth of the federal regulatory scheme, there is no room for state
law to operate. By contrast, courts have universally rejected implied
field preemption arguments in other highly regulated fields, such as
drug and medical device regulation.63 To my mind, the rigor of the
federal regulatory review is certainly relevant to the preemption de-
bate, but it does not, standing alone, justify categorical displacement
of state tort law.
In deciding whether or not the federal regulations crowd out state
law, it is worth considering both the compensatory and regulatory
roles of tort law. Current doctrine offers some support by analogy.
First, the existence and reach of federal remedial provisions are rele-
vant to the determination whether a federal statute displaces federal
common law. In County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Na-
tion of New York State, the U.S. Supreme Court contrasted the
Nonintercourse Act, which "did not establish a comprehensive reme-
dial plan for dealing with violations of Indian property rights," with
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which had specific remedial
provisions.64 The Court held that the former did not displace federal
61. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633. The Court elaborated:
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like
vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in
the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal com-
mands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and
detailed system of controls.
Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
62. Compare Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that Congress did not intend to occupy the field of airplane safety and that there was no conflict
between the plaintiff's products liability claim and FAA regulations), with Abdullah v. Am. Air-
lines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 369 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding implied field preemption given that the FAA
Administrator had "implemented a comprehensive system of rules and regulations, which pro-
motes flight safety by regulating pilot certification, pilot pre-flight duties, pilot flight responsibili-
ties, and flight rules" (footnotes omitted)), and French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1989) (describing the federal aviation regulatory scheme as an "intricate web of statutory
provisions [that] affords no room for the imposition of state-law criteria vis-a-vis pilot
suitability").
63. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug
Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 463 (2009) (making an academic's last stand argument for implied
field preemption in drug cases).
64. Cnty. of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985).
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common law, whereas the latter did.6 5 And in American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut, the Court, citing County of Oneida for the
proposition that the "reach of remedial provisions is important to de-
termination whether statute displaces federal common law," held that
the Clean Air Act and the Environmental Protection Agency actions
it authorizes displace federal common law nuisance actions seeking
abatement of carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to global
warming.66
Second, when state common law is threatened, the Supreme Court
has alluded to the backdrop of tort litigation to buttress the presump-
tion against preemption. Justice John Paul Stevens was most explicit
in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC: "The long history of tort litigation
against manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the pre-
sumption against pre-emption, for Congress surely would have ex-
pressed its intention more clearly if it had meant to deprive injured
parties of a long available form of compensation."6 7
I would consider the relevance of remedial and enforcement op-
tions for assessing the comprehensiveness of a regulatory scheme that
is required in order to categorically preempt state tort law. Against a
backdrop in which tort law effectuated both regulatory and compensa-
tory goals, the removal of state tort law without providing some kind
of substitute compensatory mechanism renders the scheme
incomplete.
65. Id. at 239 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 313-15
(1981)).
66. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011). The Court elaborated:
The Act provides multiple avenues for enforcement. EPA may delegate implementa-
tion and enforcement authority to the States, but the agency retains the power to in-
spect and monitor regulated sources, to impose administrative penalties for
noncompliance, and to commence civil actions against polluters in federal court....
And the Act provides for private enforcement. If States (or EPA) fail to enforce emis-
sions limits against regulated sources, the Act permits 'any person' to bring a civil en-
forcement action in federal court.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 432-33 (2005). The petitioners in Bates
urged that "[flor six decades prior to [enactment of the federal regulatory scheme], farmers
routinely brought state-law actions against manufacturers for damages to their crops caused by
pesticides." Brief for Petitioners at 16, Bates, 544 U.S. 431, 2004 WL 2075750. They cited cases
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Id. at 4 n.3.
Several other courts have relied on Bates for the same proposition. See, e.g., Riegel v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 128 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[W]here the states have a long tradition of provid-
ing a tort remedy to protect their citizens, the presumption against preemption is particularly
strong."), aff'd, 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 184 (Vt. 2006) (stating that
the presumption against preemption "has 'add[ed] force' when there has been a 'long history of
tort litigation' in the area of state common law at issue" (alteration in original)), affd, 555 U.S.
555 (2009).
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Congress enacted the Vaccine Act in 1986 against a distinct back-
drop of tort lawsuits. Indeed, Congress was motivated to act in large
part by the escalating lawsuits filed against vaccine manufacturers.
The number of product-liability cases filed against manufacturers
increased substantially in the early 1980s. Manufacturers of DTP
were sued once each year in 1978 and 1979, four times in 1980, and
three times in 1981. In 1982 there were 17 lawsuits against DTP
manufacturers; that number rose to 219 in 1985 and 255 in 1986.68
Tort law was doing double-duty, regulating vaccine safety while simul-
taneously providing compensation to injured victims. 69
Against this backdrop of tort lawsuits-or, more accurately, in re-
sponse to it-Congress not only created a new regulatory framework
for vaccines but also set up the federal Vaccine Fund. Given the exis-
tence of a federal compensation scheme, field (or categorical) pre-
emption claims are not taken off the table. But nor should that be the
end of the story; here is where Frame Three comes into play.
V. FRAME THREE: AGENCY REFERENCE MODEL
In numerous contexts, I have proposed an "agency reference
model,"70 which compares the risk-benefit (or risk-risk) assessment
by the federal agency with that required by the jury under the relevant
state law tort standard. It depends on the existence of "a specialized
agency with domain-specific authority over the risk-creating conduct
at the core of the tort claim."71 The Bruesewitz result-if not the Su-
preme Court's textualist reasoning-comports with the agency refer-
ence model. First, the stringent pre- and post-approval regulatory
review of vaccines by several federal agencies seems to have influ-
enced the Justices' opinions in the case. Second, a searching probe of
the regulatory record of the DTP vaccine at issue (which the Justices
68. RICHARD ARNOULD & LARRY DEBROCK, The Application of Economic Theory to the
Market, in SUPPLYING VACCINES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES 101, 118 (Mark
V. Pauly et al. eds., 1996) (citation omitted). After passage of the Vaccine Act, tort lawsuits
dropped significantly in number. "[T]he number of cases declined from 255 cases in 1986 to 144
in 1988, 47 in 1989, 19 in 1990, and 18 in 1991." Id.
69. The Bruesewitz district court took note of the Bates Court's reliance upon the history of
tort litigation, but held that such history is not, by itself, enough: "Bates merely underscores the
need to pay close attention to the scope of the [federal statute's] preemption clause and assists
the court in framing the questions to be addressed." Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d
430, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (quoting Mills v. Giant of Md., LLC, 441 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D.D.C.
2006)), affd, 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), affd, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
70. See Sharkey, Federalism Accountability, supra note 8, at 2153; Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption, supra note 8, at 477-502.
71. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, supra note 36, at 2052.
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did not undertake but which is called for under the agency reference
model) supports a finding of preemption.
A. An Alternative Reading of Bruesewitz
Recasting Bruesewitz in terms of the agency reference model, we
begin by examining the structure of the underlying regulatory review
process. More so than for any product or drug, the government is
heavily involved in the development of vaccines and in the testing of
their safety and efficacy.72 Several federal agencies are involved in the
process that leads to the government's recommendations for routine
vaccine administration to children. The FDA must approve the vac-
cine for "safety and effectiveness" and grant a license to a specific
manufacturer.73 The Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and CDC, however, have primary responsibility for the admin-
istration of vaccines that are included in the Vaccine Injury Table (Ta-
ble). Congress has delegated authority to the Secretary of HHS to
manage the Table based on CDC's recommendations and reports of
side effects.74 The Secretary's determinations are, moreover, subject
to several layers of congressionally directed oversight. The Secretary
cannot act without first consulting with the Advisory Commission on
Childhood Vaccines (ACCV), a body established by Congress to ad-
vise the Secretary on implementation of the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, including recommending changes to the Ta-
ble.7 5 The ACCV is a diverse body, composed of nine members ap-
pointed by the Secretary-including three health professionals, three
members from the general public (at least two of whom are legal rep-
resentatives of children who have suffered vaccine-related injury or
death), and three attorneys (including one who represents plaintiffs
and one who represents manufacturers in vaccine-injury litigation)-
plus (as nonvoting ex officio members) the Director of the National
Institutes of Health, the Assistant Secretary for Health, the Director
of CDC, and the Commissioner of the FDA.76
72. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45-46, Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068 ("The government
sets the agenda for what are our targets for development.").
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(d) (2011); 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(a)(2).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(e)(2) ("When ... [CDC] recommends a vaccine to the Secretary
[of HHS] for routine administration to children, the Secretary shall, within 2 years of such rec-
ommendation, amend the Vaccine Injury Table . . . .").
75. See id. § 300aa-14(d) ("[Tihe Secretary [of HHS] may not propose a regulation ... unless
the Secretary has first provided to the Commission a copy of the proposed regulation or revision,
requested recommendations and comments by the Commission, and afforded the Commission at
least 90 days to make such recommendations.").
76. Id. § 300aa-19(a).
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As the Solicitor General represented before the Court, "the catego-
ries of vaccines on the Table reflect the concurrent judgments of ex-
pert scientists at CDC and of Congress."77 Before any vaccine is
included on the Table, scientists at CDC-and the government em-
phasizes it is scientists, not lawyers-must make a "reasoned judg-
ment" that the vaccine should be "recommended for routine
administration" to children.78 CDC works closely with pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers as well as the medical and scientific community in a
collaborative process leading up to its recommendations. 79 In its con-
sideration of the risks and benefits of vaccines, CDC analyzes not only
FDA-approved vaccines and proposed vaccines, but also the back-
ground scientific literature as a whole.80 CDC's conclusions are pub-
lished in its official journal, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.s,
While the Secretary's decision-making process for Table revisions
has been criticized for lack of transparency, 82 according to the govern-
ment, "the Secretary's management of the Table has been challenged
only rarely, and never successfully."8 3
Government involvement and oversight, moreover, extends beyond
initial approval and Table listing to the equally (if not more) signifi-
cant realm of post-approval monitoring. HHS administers the Vac-
cine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), used by
manufacturers and health care providers to report and monitor ad-
verse events caused by a vaccine on the Table.8 4 CDC administers the
Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD), which allows CDC to coordinate with
manufacturers to investigate the side effects of recommended vaccines
and to keep a watchful ongoing eye on the safety of vaccines.85
77. See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 30, at 28.
78. Id. at 3; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 72, at 46.
79. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 72, at 45 ("[T]he vaccines that are on the
original table in this statute were taken from CDC's recommendations that reflect CDC's expert
scientific judgment, based on the input from the medical and scientific community, of what vac-
cines do we have that are the ones we should use to protect the public health?").
80. See id. at 50-52.
81. Id. at 49.
82. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Marguerite Willner in Support of Petitioners at 24,
Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 2010 WL 2224729 (criticizing the fact that "seizures have been re-
moved from the Table, although that the pertussis vaccine can cause seizures is uncontested (and
warned in the manufacturer's package insert)"); id. at 24 n.14 ("Hannah Bruesewitz's injuries
likely would have been considered on-Table but for the 1995 administrative revisions [which
removed seizures].").
83. U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 30, at 29.
84. Id. at 21.
85. See id. at 22. The government provided as an illustrative example its experience with
Rotashield, a vaccine that protects children from rotavirus. Id. at 23. In March 1999, CDC
recommended routine administration of Rotashield. Id. At that time, clinical trials showed no
statistically significant adverse effects. Id. at 23-24. Subsequently, however, data reported to
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Consistent with the thrust of the agency reference model-and con-
trary to formalist, textualist models of statutory interpretation that are
especially prevalent in the express preemption realm-the rigorous
system of approval and post-approval monitoring of vaccines influ-
enced both the Bruesewitz majority opinion and Justice Breyer's sepa-
rate concurrence. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia points to the
postapproval monitoring by federal agencies (as well as the existence
of the compensation scheme) as suggesting that Congress's statutory
silence regarding design defects should be read as evincing its intent
that, unlike manufacturing-defect or failure-to-warn claims, design-
defect claims should not be a basis for tort liability: "These provisions
for federal agency improvement of vaccine design, and for federally
prescribed compensation, once again suggest that § 300aa-22(b)(1)'s
silence regarding design-defect liability was not inadvertent." 8 6
Justice Breyer-consistent with his track record as the staunchest
purveyor of something akin to the agency reference model87-places
more emphatic weight on the views of HHS. For Justice Breyer, in the
face of ambiguous statutory language and murky evidence of congres-
sional intent, the "rigorous administrative safety review" of vaccines
and HHS's thorough understanding of vaccine production and safety
sufficed to read the Vaccine Act as preempting state tort design-defect
claims.88
Even the dissent frames its disagreement within the paradigm of the
agency reference model. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the dis-
sent, chides the majority for "leav[ing] a regulatory vacuum in which
no one ensures that vaccine manufacturers adequately take account of
scientific and technological advancements when designing or distribut-
ing their products." 9 Specifically, "neither the Act nor any other pro-
vision of federal law places a legal duty on vaccine manufacturers to
VAERS showed some adverse events linked to the administration of Rotashield. Id. As a re-
sult, CDC conducted a subsequent investigation of the vaccine's safety through VSD. Id.
CDC's investigation discovered an increased risk of bowel obstruction in infants and led to the
suspension of Rotashield's administration and to the ultimate withdrawal of Rotashield from the
market. Id. at 24.
86. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1080.
87. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1135 (2011); Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 582 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529
U.S. 861, 868 (2000); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, The Politics of Preemption: NHTSA, State
Tort Law & Automobile Safety, TORTSPROF BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/tortsprof/2010/10/guest-blogger-cathy-sharkey-on-the-politics-of-preemption-nhtsa-state-
tort-law-automobile-safety.html (noting Justice Breyer's propensity to defer to agency determi-
nations of whether state tort law impedes federal purpose).
88. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1085 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 1086 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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improve the design of their vaccines to account for scientific and tech-
nological advances." 90
B. Probing the Regulatory Record
The disagreement between the majority and dissent highlights the
fact-intensive nature of the inquiry called forth by the agency refer-
ence model. The most demanding formulation of the relevant stan-
dard asks: Did the relevant federal agency weigh the precise
risk-benefit (or risk-risk) tradeoffs that constitute the state law
design-defect standard? The Bruesewitz majority, and especially Jus-
tice Breyer's concurrence, answers with a resounding yes, whereas the
dissent is skeptical. Alas, the agency regulatory record is a bit murky,
at least in part because, notwithstanding its apparent influence on Su-
preme Court decision making, cases are not (yet) consistently litigated
with the agency reference model in mind.91
Here is what can be gleaned from the existing regulatory record.
There was a push in the 1950s and 1960s to develop alternative DTP
vaccines in light of evidence of serious side effects (including seizures)
from the injection of whole cell vaccines. An alternative "fraction-
ated" vaccine, Tri-Solgen, was available in the U.S. market and was
90. Id. at 1097.
91. This is beginning to change. Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (W.D.
Okla. 2008), provides an instructive example. In that case, the district court granted a summary
judgment motion on preemption:
The record establishes that the express type of warning which Plaintiff claims Defen-
dant should have included in its Effexor label had been considered and rejected by the
FDA as not supported by credible evidence at the time Mr. Dobbs used Effexor.
Where the FDA has evaluated scientific evidence regarding an alleged risk associated
with a drug, has considered whether that evidence warrants a labeling warning, and has
expressly rejected the need for such warning as not supported by credible evidence, a
state law determination that such a warning is required creates a conflict for the manu-
facturer as between federal and state law, and imposes inconsistent federal and state
obligations.
Id. at 1289-90 (footnote omitted). After Levine announced a "clear evidence" rule for the stan-
dard of proof necessary to support a claim of conflict preemption based on FDA labeling regula-
tions, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court's order, 606 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2010). The district court then
granted a renewed motion for summary judgment on preemption, distinguishing the regulatory
record in the case from that in Levine:
[T]he record reflects the FDA's ongoing study and analyses regarding the propriety of
enhancing SSRI warnings to include the association between SSRIs and suicidality.
That history is in contrast to the facts in Levine, in which the Court noted that the trial
court found the record reflected that, during the time period relevant to the claims
asserted, neither the manufacturer or the FDA "gave more than passing attention" to
the issue of the proper method for intravenous administration of Phenargen.
Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharms., No. CIV 04 1762, 2011 WL 2746321, at *10 (W.D. Okla. June 13, 2011)
(quoting Levine, 555 U.S. at 572), appeal docketed, No. 12-6077 (10th Cir. filed Mar. 22, 2012).
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heavily used throughout the early 1970s. 9 2 In 1975, Eli Lilly sold the
license for Tri-Solgen to Wyeth.93 Because Eli Lilly's FDA certifica-
tion was not transferrable to Wyeth, Wyeth had to reapply for FDA
certification. 94 Wyeth submitted a modified version of Tri-Solgen to
the FDA, which the FDA rejected, "citing the need for further design
improvements, concerns about two adverse reactions in trials of the
modified Lilly design, and the lack of conclusive evidence that the
modified Lilly design was more effective than Wyeth's whole cell DTP
[vaccine]." 95 Wyeth made no attempt to resubmit an application for
its modified version of Tri-Solgen or its original Eli Lilly formula-
tion.96 As a result, Tri-Solgen was discontinued altogether in 1977,97
though Eli Lilly remained licensed by the FDA to sell Tri-Solgen until
the manufacturer requested that the FDA revoke the license in 1985.98
Starting in the mid-1980s, the FDA and CDC began studying
whether whole cell vaccines should be phased out in favor of "frac-
tionated" vaccines (such as Tri-Solgen) or newer "acellular" vaccines
(such as Acel-Imune). 99 In a 1985 proposed rule, the FDA recom-
mended additional field testing of any fractionated pertussis vaccines
and stated that "[r]esearch to develop a new generation of acellular
pertussis vaccines is in a dynamic state; thus it is difficult to predict
92. See Toner v. Lederle Labs., 779 F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986) ("During the 1950's, the Eli
Lilly Company developed a fractionated cell pertussis vaccine called Tri-Solgen that was pre-
pared by treating whole killed pertussis cells with salt. Early studies indicated that this method
of preparation resulted in a less toxic vaccine, and following its approval by the FDA in 1967,
Tri-Solgen occupied a substantial share of the market.").
93. Ackley v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 919 F.2d 397, 398 (6th Cir. 1990).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 398-99; see also Toner, 779 F.2d at 1431 ("[A] review panel within the Bureau of
Biologies of the FDA refused to certify Tri-Solgen as 'safe and effective' although it did so certify
the whole cell vaccines."). Toner was a pre-Vaccine Act products liability case in which the
plaintiffs asserted basically the same design-defect claim as the Bruesewitzes-namely, that Wy-
eth should have manufactured Tri-Solgen, not Tri-Immunol. See id. The district court rejected
the plaintiffs' claim, holding that Tri-Solgen was not an alternate design, given that its FDA
license had been revoked. See id.
96. See White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ohio 1988) (Douglas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The FDA suggested changes Wyeth would have to make in this
vaccine in order for the FDA to approve it. However, Wyeth made no further attempts to li-
cense the vaccine.").
97. See Selected Discontinued U.S. Vaccines, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/
pinkbook/downloads/appendices/b/discontinuedvaccines.pdf (last visited Nov. 2011).
98. Ackley, 919 F.2d at 402; accord Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids; Im-
plementation of Efficacy Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 255, 257 (Jan. 5, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts.
201, 610) ("On December 2, 1985, FDA revoked the [Eli Lilly] license for Diphtheria and Teta-
nus Toxoids and Pertussis Vaccine Adsorbed at the request of the manufacturer.").
99. See Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids; Implementation of Efficacy Re-
view, 50 Fed. Reg. 51002, 51112 (Dec. 13, 1985) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 610) (discussing begin-
ning development, clinical testing, and evaluation of new "acellular pertussis vaccines").
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what tests would be necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of a
newly developed acellular pertussis vaccine."'oo Acel-Imune was rec-
ommended for routine administration as the fourth and fifth DTP
booster shots in 1992;101 the recommendation was in force when
Hannah Bruesewitz was vaccinated. In 1994, the U.S. Institute of Sci-
ence concluded that Tri-Immunol could cause brain damage, and HHS
published this finding in the Federal Register. 0 2 The FDA approved
Acel-Imune for all five DTP vaccination doses in 1996.103 In 1997,
CDC recommended Acel-Imune for all DTP vaccinations.' 0 4 In 1998,
Wyeth voluntarily removed Tri-Immunol from the market. 05
Significantly, during the Bruesewitz oral argument, the Solicitor
General represented to the Court that the
Federal Government made a choice and said we . . . don't want
manufacturers and our scientists pursuing the . . . Tri-Solgen ap-
proach and trying to improve that. We don't understand that vac-
cine very well. We know the ultimate target needs to be the
development of an acellular vaccine, and so that's the research path
... to go on.106
Neither the briefs nor oral argument in Bruesewitz, however, focus on
the relevant evidence from the agency record. Nor do the parties
elaborate upon the FDA revocation of the license for Tri-Solgen. 07
Nor do any of CDC's reports mention Tri-Solgen or the use of frac-
tionated or acellular vaccines in the 1960s and 1970s. 108 Whereas the
1985 FDA rule discusses the need for further testing of fractionated
vaccines (such as Tri-Solgen) to prove their efficacy and references the
"dynamic" state of research on acellular varieties, it does not go so far
100. Id.
101. See Notice to Readers, Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule-United States,
1997, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jan. 17, 1997, at 35, 38, available at ftp://
ftp.cdc.gov/publPublications/mmwr/wk/mm4602.pdf.
102. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revision to Vaccine Injury Table, 59
Fed. Reg. 13,916, 13,918 (Mar. 24, 1994) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 100).
103. Notice to Readers, FDA Approval of a Second Acellular Pertussis Vaccine for Use
Among Infants and Young Children, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Feb. 7, 1997, at
110, 110 (1997), available at ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/wk/mm4605.pdf; see also
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2009).
104. See Notice to Readers, supra note 101, at 38.
105. Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 237.
106. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 72, at 46.
107. See supra notes 95-98 for an explanation of how Tri-Solgen's license was revoked.
108. My research assistant, Matthew Shahabian, conducted searches of the Federal Register
and a Google search of the public .gov top-level domain (Google search for site: *.gov) for "Tri-
Solgen" or "Solgen." Searches for "acellular" or "fractionated" DTP vaccines did not return any
information from CDC prior to its 1990s investigation and recommendations. This regulatory
record may be more complete in a nondigitized form, but that record is not available online nor
discussed in the briefing for the Bruesewitz case.
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as to establish a clear choice of acellular vaccines (such as Acel-
Imune).109
Nonetheless, assuming that the regulatory record-if it were fully
presented to the Court as would be necessary under the agency refer-
ence model-backs the Solicitor General's statement that the relevant
federal agencies specifically rejected Tri-Solgen, this would clearly
conflict with a state law design-defect claim premised on Tri-Solgen as
the viable alternative that would have "avoided" the side effects of the
Tri-Immunol vaccine administered to Hannah Bruesewitz. According
to the agency reference model (pursuant in fact to its most demanding
standard; namely, that the relevant agency specifically reject the alter-
native design at the heart of the plaintiff's state tort law claim), pre-
emption should follow.
VI. CONCLUSION: PUTTING THE FRAMES TOGETHER
Bruesewitz lays bare the flaws in the U.S. Supreme Court's preemp-
tion jurisprudence. Though ostensibly an express preemption case
that turned on the plain meaning of statutory language, the Court
moved beyond statutory text and legislative history (what I have
termed "Frame One") into the realm of policy-based arguments mas-
querading as evidence of congressional intent. I have offered two fur-
ther analytic frames to replace the Court's exhortations of
congressional intent as the touchstone of preemption analysis. Frame
Two considers the relevance of the existence of remedial provisions
within the federal regulatory scheme, alongside the pre-existing tort
law litigation backdrop. Rather than assigning dispositive weight to
this factor, or allowing it to tip the balance of the scale one way or
another via a default presumption against (or in favor of) preemption,
I propose that compensation be linked to categorical preemption
claims. Specifically, remedial provisions should be a necessary com-
ponent of a federal regulatory scheme deemed so comprehensive as to
leave no room for state tort law. The absence of a federal compensa-
109. In fact, although the FDA Panel expressed concern over the extent of rigorous efficacy
testing on Tri-Solgen, it recommended (by a split vote of three to two) that Tri-Solgen be placed
in "Category I for primary immunization," finding that it was "safe, effective, and not mis-
branded." Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids; Implementation of Efficacy Re-
view, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,002, 51,002, 51,052 (Dec. 13, 1985) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 610). This
recommendation, interestingly, was the result of an administrative mistake, as the Panel was not
aware that the FDA had revoked Eli Lilly's license just two weeks earlier at the manufacturer's
request. Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids; Implementation of Efficacy Re-
view, 69 Fed. Reg. 255, 257 (Jan. 5, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 610) ("On December 2,
1985, FDA revoked the license for Diphtheria and Tetanus Toxoids and Pertussis Vaccine Ad-
sorbed at the request of the manufacturer. FDA inadvertently omitted this information in the
December 1985 proposal.").
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tion scheme would take arguments for categorical preemption off the
table. But the mere presence of such a scheme should not end the
inquiry-at least where congressional ambiguity persists. Frame
Three superimposes the agency reference model, which zeroes in on
narrower conflict preemption questions, interrogating whether the
regulating federal agency addressed the same risk that is the basis for
the state law tort claim.
Putting the frames together, Bruesewitz would likely reach the same
outcome, albeit on far narrower grounds. The majority decision reads
much like a field preemption case and upholds categorical preemption
of all design-defect claims, regardless of the regulatory record of the
underlying agencies. In reaching its decision, the majority highlights
the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme. 110 Under my Frame
Two, the existence of the federal administrative compensation scheme
is relevant to the determination of comprehensiveness, such that cate-
gorical preemption claims are not foreclosed. However, Frame Three
provides a more solid foundation for a preemption determination, es-
pecially in the realm of health and safety. In Bruesewitz, preemption
would be limited to the class of vaccines whose safety profile was in-
vestigated by the FDA, HHS, and CDC via a regulatory record that
would be scrutinized by the courts. More generally, the agency refer-
ence model takes an implicit stand against categorical preemption
claims.
110. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1079 (stating that the Act "micromanages" manufacturers and
that the Act and vaccine regulations in general "pervasively regulate the manufacturing
process").
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